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Empirical Analysis and Countermeasures of Interprovincial Tax Transfer in China

Received: 7 November 2018     Published: 8 November 2018
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Abstract

The reform of the Tax-sharing System in China only regulates the vertical tax distribution relationship between the central government and the local government, but the horizontal tax distribution contradiction between the local governments is increasingly prominent. This paper takes China as an example, using data and empirical models, combined with theoretical analysis, discusses the problems of tax transfer and tax coordination among different regions in a country, which is essentially the problem of the deviation from tax and tax sources. This paper calculates the degree of deviation between regional tax and tax sources by the method of proportion difference, and makes an empirical analysis of the factors affecting tax transfer, including market size, labor cost, trade cost, urbanization level, degree of opening. It explains the phenomena, causes, impacts and harm on economic development of tax transfer among regions in China. Those impacts include: increasing regional disparities and hindering regional coordinated development, widening the gap in public services between regions, stimulating the irrational investment behavior and scale expansion of local governments, distorting economic indicators is not conducive to scientific decision-making, deteriorating the natural environment of the resource-providing place, influencing the construction of the harmonious society. Then make the suggestion that the macro level top-level design plan and policy should be adopted at the national level: improve the tax distribution system for horizontal transfer payments, improve the vertical financial transfer payment distribution system, reform the tax system appropriately according to the principle that the tax is consistent with the tax source, improve the tax collection and management system, improve the management of corporate consolidated tax payment, promote the reform of the price mechanism of resource elements and solving the problem of the resource pricing distortion, reform the performance evaluation indicators of local governments to prevent vicious tax competition, replace regional tax incentives with industrial tax incentives.

Published in American Journal of Management Science and Engineering (Volume 3, Issue 5)
DOI 10.11648/j.ajmse.20180305.13
Page(s) 53-59
Creative Commons

This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.

Copyright

Copyright © The Author(s), 2018. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Tax Transfer, Tax Deviation, Empirical Analysis

References
[1] Zhang Chunyu. Research on the tax relations between the central government and the provincial local government [D].Shengyang: Northeast university of finance and economics, 2017, 6.
[2] Forest tenure, Zhang Gemeng. Research on the problems and countermeasures of regional tax transfer in China[J]. Knowledge economy, 2018, 02:28-30.
[3] Li Jianjun, Wang Ruixiang. Who benefits from the intergovernmental tax division? -- Based on the analysis of tax deviation and tax benefit [J]. Financial issues research, 2018, 1: 76-83.
[4] Yuan Jiao. Spatial econometric empirical study on regional agglomeration and difference of tax transfer [D]. Kunming: Yunnan university of finance and economics, 2013.
[5] Jiang Wei. Location decision of FDI in China: Spatial econometric analysis based on "third-party effect" [J]. World economic research, 2012, 01:75-80.
[6] Liu Yeting. A study on the horizontal transfer of tax between regions in China -Taking enterprise income tax and value-added tax as the main measurements basis[D]. Hefei: Anhui University, 2012.
[7] Chen Wenbin. Study on the deviation of tax sources and the horizontal distribution of taxes between regions in China [D]. Jinan : Jinan University, 2012.
[8] Li Chunying. Study on horizontal transfer of taxation in China [D]. Changsha: Hunan university, 2013.
[9] Liu Jianhui, Tang Wenqian, Zhou Zhibo. Causes and countermeasures of unbalanced horizontal tax distribution in China[J]. Tax research, 2012, 2: 41-43.
[10] Wang Lingmiao. Problems and countermeasures of regional tax transfer in China [D]. Shenyang: Liaoning university, 2013.
[11] Luo Siping. Reference to China's tax source management from international experience[J]. Economic research guide, 2011, 18: 19-20.
[12] Wang Min, Yuan Jiao. Asymmetry between regional taxation and tax source: Impact mechanism and realistic path selection [J] Tax research, 2017, 5: 59-63.
[13] Dong Zaiping. A study of regional tax transfer in China from the perspective of fiscal decentralization[J]. Reform of the economic system, 2009, (2): 121-125.
[14] Yang Xianyue. Research on the adjustment of transfer pricing of affiliated enterprises and countermeasures [J]. China foreign capital, 2013, 4:23-24.
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  • APA Style

    Junjun Zhang, Ke Gao. (2018). Empirical Analysis and Countermeasures of Interprovincial Tax Transfer in China. American Journal of Management Science and Engineering, 3(5), 53-59. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ajmse.20180305.13

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    ACS Style

    Junjun Zhang; Ke Gao. Empirical Analysis and Countermeasures of Interprovincial Tax Transfer in China. Am. J. Manag. Sci. Eng. 2018, 3(5), 53-59. doi: 10.11648/j.ajmse.20180305.13

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    AMA Style

    Junjun Zhang, Ke Gao. Empirical Analysis and Countermeasures of Interprovincial Tax Transfer in China. Am J Manag Sci Eng. 2018;3(5):53-59. doi: 10.11648/j.ajmse.20180305.13

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  • @article{10.11648/j.ajmse.20180305.13,
      author = {Junjun Zhang and Ke Gao},
      title = {Empirical Analysis and Countermeasures of Interprovincial Tax Transfer in China},
      journal = {American Journal of Management Science and Engineering},
      volume = {3},
      number = {5},
      pages = {53-59},
      doi = {10.11648/j.ajmse.20180305.13},
      url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ajmse.20180305.13},
      eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ajmse.20180305.13},
      abstract = {The reform of the Tax-sharing System in China only regulates the vertical tax distribution relationship between the central government and the local government, but the horizontal tax distribution contradiction between the local governments is increasingly prominent. This paper takes China as an example, using data and empirical models, combined with theoretical analysis, discusses the problems of tax transfer and tax coordination among different regions in a country, which is essentially the problem of the deviation from tax and tax sources. This paper calculates the degree of deviation between regional tax and tax sources by the method of proportion difference, and makes an empirical analysis of the factors affecting tax transfer, including market size, labor cost, trade cost, urbanization level, degree of opening. It explains the phenomena, causes, impacts and harm on economic development of tax transfer among regions in China. Those impacts include: increasing regional disparities and hindering regional coordinated development, widening the gap in public services between regions, stimulating the irrational investment behavior and scale expansion of local governments, distorting economic indicators is not conducive to scientific decision-making, deteriorating the natural environment of the resource-providing place, influencing the construction of the harmonious society. Then make the suggestion that the macro level top-level design plan and policy should be adopted at the national level: improve the tax distribution system for horizontal transfer payments, improve the vertical financial transfer payment distribution system, reform the tax system appropriately according to the principle that the tax is consistent with the tax source, improve the tax collection and management system, improve the management of corporate consolidated tax payment, promote the reform of the price mechanism of resource elements and solving the problem of the resource pricing distortion, reform the performance evaluation indicators of local governments to prevent vicious tax competition, replace regional tax incentives with industrial tax incentives.},
     year = {2018}
    }
    

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  • TY  - JOUR
    T1  - Empirical Analysis and Countermeasures of Interprovincial Tax Transfer in China
    AU  - Junjun Zhang
    AU  - Ke Gao
    Y1  - 2018/11/08
    PY  - 2018
    N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ajmse.20180305.13
    DO  - 10.11648/j.ajmse.20180305.13
    T2  - American Journal of Management Science and Engineering
    JF  - American Journal of Management Science and Engineering
    JO  - American Journal of Management Science and Engineering
    SP  - 53
    EP  - 59
    PB  - Science Publishing Group
    SN  - 2575-1379
    UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ajmse.20180305.13
    AB  - The reform of the Tax-sharing System in China only regulates the vertical tax distribution relationship between the central government and the local government, but the horizontal tax distribution contradiction between the local governments is increasingly prominent. This paper takes China as an example, using data and empirical models, combined with theoretical analysis, discusses the problems of tax transfer and tax coordination among different regions in a country, which is essentially the problem of the deviation from tax and tax sources. This paper calculates the degree of deviation between regional tax and tax sources by the method of proportion difference, and makes an empirical analysis of the factors affecting tax transfer, including market size, labor cost, trade cost, urbanization level, degree of opening. It explains the phenomena, causes, impacts and harm on economic development of tax transfer among regions in China. Those impacts include: increasing regional disparities and hindering regional coordinated development, widening the gap in public services between regions, stimulating the irrational investment behavior and scale expansion of local governments, distorting economic indicators is not conducive to scientific decision-making, deteriorating the natural environment of the resource-providing place, influencing the construction of the harmonious society. Then make the suggestion that the macro level top-level design plan and policy should be adopted at the national level: improve the tax distribution system for horizontal transfer payments, improve the vertical financial transfer payment distribution system, reform the tax system appropriately according to the principle that the tax is consistent with the tax source, improve the tax collection and management system, improve the management of corporate consolidated tax payment, promote the reform of the price mechanism of resource elements and solving the problem of the resource pricing distortion, reform the performance evaluation indicators of local governments to prevent vicious tax competition, replace regional tax incentives with industrial tax incentives.
    VL  - 3
    IS  - 5
    ER  - 

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Author Information
  • The School of Finance and Taxation, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, P.R. China

  • “The Belt and Road” Economic Development Research Center, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan, P. R. China

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